Inflation targeting with special review on application in Serbia by Fabris Nikola
PANOECONOMICUS, 2006, 4, str. 389-405                                            UDC 336.748.12(497.11) 
 
Inflation Targeting With Special Review on  
Appliction in Serbia 
 
Nikola Fabris
∗ 
 
Summary:  Inflation targeting represents monetary regime primarily applied in New 
Zealand in 1989. Since then, this regime has extended into over 30 countries and it is 
recommended by International Monetary Fund within its business arrangements in last 
couple of years. The last country that announced this regime was Serbia. It is regularly 
introduced when previous one had poor performances. Its nature is determined by tar-
geted inflation rate, high level of transparency in monetary policies conducting, absence 
of secondary goals, as well as responsibility for realized targeted inflation rates. Within 
work, theoretical presumptions are analyzed regarding implementation of this regime, 
and the most important aspects of its functioning in chosen countries, and its application 
in Serbia is a subject of particular consideration. 
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1. Basic Characteristics of Inflation Targeting 
 
While most innovations in economic policy have spread from large to small 
countries, inflation targeting is an exception. The first time inflation targeting 
was applied in 1989 by New Zealand, and since then this concept has become 
increasingly popular, being accepted by over 30 countries so far. Many countries 
adopted it after experiencing exchange rate or inflationary crises. Although the 
European Central Bank has not officially accepted this concept, the monetary 
policy followed by the ECB is largely similar to inflation targeting. Even though 
there have been debates in the USA for many years about introducing inflation 
targeting, so far the FED has not yet decided to start with this concept.  
Inflation targeting has usually been employed when some other monetary 
regime has yielded poor results. Many European countries accepted this concept 
after the unexpected ERM collapse in 1992. Great Britain adopted an inflation 
targeting regime in 1992 after abandoning the exchange rate mechanism. Shortly 
afterwards the concept was accepted by Sweden (1993), Finland (1993), and 
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Spain (1994). Canada (1991) introduced inflation targeting after poor results 
from monetary targeting.  
B. Bernanke (1999, p. 23) defined the inflation targeting concept as a mone-
tary policy framework whose characteristics are a public announcement of the 
numeric target (or zone) for one or more time periods, and an explicit statement 
that a low, stable inflation rate represents the main monetary policy objective. 
Other important characteristics of inflation targeting are related to great efforts 
in communicating with the public about the plans and objectives of monetary 
policy.  
Stone (2003, p. 128) believes that four prerequisites are necessary for infla-
tion targeting to be implemented. The first one refers to reducing inflation as an 
objective of a central bank, simultaneously making it one of the responsibilities 
of a central bank. The second prerequisite relates to avoiding a situation where 
inflation downsizing is subordinate to some other objective, while the third one 
concerns a well-developed and stable financial system. The last prerequisite im-
plies the utilization of monetary policy instruments aimed at reducing, i.e. sus-
taining the inflation rate.  
At first glance there may be the dilemma whether this could even be a mone-
tary regime, and how an intermediate objective could simultaneously be the ul-
timate objective. This is, however, a monetary regime since it implies a struc-
tural approach to achieving the objective. The main difference between this re-
gime and one where there is complete monetary policy discretion lies in the pro-
cedure of selecting a monetary policy objective, the initiative for achieving the 
objective, as well as a high level of monetary policy transparency.  
Four main principles serve as the grounds for targeting inflation: 
  Pursuing price stability, 
  A numerically represented inflation rate target, 
  A high level of system transparency: publishing reports, econometric as-
sessments, guest appearances in the media, and 
  The responsibility for results achieved. 
 
Box  1 - Sanctions in a Case of Inflation Target Breach – New Zealand Ex-
perience 
 
The most drastic example of sanctioning a Governor for an inflation target 
breach is New Zealand. In such a case, a Governor may be relieved of their du-
ties. The dismissal procedure is not immediate, and the decision on the dismissal 
may be passed by the Minister of Finance or the Government. Breaches of the 
agreed target are considered acceptable in cases of exceptional circumstances, 
such as: 
 
•  Sudden global prices rise, 
•  Changes in taxation, Inflation Targeting With Special Review on Appliction in Serbia 
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•  Government policy that affects price movements, and 
•  Natural disasters. 
 
The nature of these unforeseen circumstances must be explained in detail, and 
the Minister of Finance has „the final word” in deciding whether the alleged rea-
sons are justifiable. Targets were not achieved twice in the mid-1990`s, but the 
deviations were relatively small. Instead of dismissing the Governor, the Gov-
ernment decided to extend the target range.  
 
In order for inflation targeting to be successful, a high level of central bank 
independence is a sine qua non. In most cases, countries that have accepted in-
flation targeting have the liberty to choose the instruments for achieving the tar-
geted inflation rate, but not the choice of the target. The selection of a target in 
this regime is usually made by a government, a Parliament, or an appointed poli-
tician. This concept excludes the possibility of a central bank having any other 
goal except the targeted rate of inflation. This concept also implies a high level 
of central bank transparency and credibility because, as underlined by B. Fried-
man (2003, p. 120), targeting inflation is way of manipulating with expectations 
about future inflation.  
The announcement of the inflation target itself is not considered the target-
ing inflation process, and as pointed by Carare (2003, p. 152), many years may 
pass from the announcement of inflation target until acceptance of inflation tar-
geting regime.  
The first dilemma that emerges when introducing the inflation target may be 
the setting of the time horizon for it. There have been various solutions to this 
issue in practice because the inflation target cannot be set once and for all since 
inflation is always under the influence of unpredicted shocks and time lags. If 
interest rates affect the inflation rate, then it is pointless to set a target for the 
following year. Only a small number of central banks that have accepted this 
concept have set as their objective to bring inflation to the targeted value in the 
short-term because such policies would „knock” the economy off balance. An 
optimum time horizon could be viewed as a time period required for economic 
policy to give some results in practise. For example, at the beginning of targeting 
inflation, Canada and New Zealand adopted a period of 18 months, Australia 
defined it as the business cycle period, while in Great Britain the Government 
may change the target every year or adjust it to the cycle phase.   
Another dilemma may be which index to target. Most countries accepted the 
solution for this to be the consumer price index, using the core inflation concept 
at first in order to avoid the negative effects of potential shocks due to increases 
in food prices, energy products, indirect taxes, and the like.  
Inflation target could be defined in various ways: as a unique value, as the 
fluctuation zone, or as the fluctuation zone around fixed central parity. Neverthe-
less, a relatively small number of banks define the target as a numerical value, Nikola Fabris 
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and in most cases it is defined around the fluctuation zone. No central bank has 
defined inflation target as a zero inflation rate, and a very few of them that target 
the fluctuation zone define the zone from the zero rate upward. Most of the infla-
tion targets range between 1% and 4%, and higher than that could only be found 
in developing countries. The proposal provided by Svensson (1997) is also inter-
esting, suggesting that the inflation target should be the rate forecasted by a cen-
tral bank. If any shock or monetary policy instrument lead to a divergence from 
the forecasted rate of inflation, then a central bank should undertake corrective 
measures in order to bring back the rate onto the forecasted track. The following 
graph shows the inflation target definition in different countries. 
 
Graph 1.  Inflation target selection 
 
Source: Kutner, K. (2004.), „Monetary Policy – Framework and Rules” * - fulfilled by 
author 
In this regime it is not possible to use the foreign exchange rate as the nomi-
nal anchor, but this does not rule out foreign exchange market interventions that 
could primarily be used for moderating the consequences of occasional shocks. 
Interesting examples may be Chile and Israel which used a managed float re-
gime at the moment of introducing inflation targeting due to the great impor-
tance of the exchange rate for stability. Both countries intervened in the foreign 
exchange market in order to preserve the exchange rates within the zone. The 
zones expanded over time, thus not being an impediment to monetary policy fol-
lowing the inflation targeting policy, and Israel later abolished them.  
A dilemma may also be about who is responsible for setting and announcing 
the inflation target. Three options have emerged in practise: a central bank, a 
government (usually the Ministry of Finance), or jointly a central bank and a 
government. In most cases it was done jointly by central bank and government Inflation Targeting With Special Review on Appliction in Serbia 
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in order to show that there is no conflict between monetary and fiscal policy and 
that all policy makers are devoted to achieving the target. 
 
Box 2 Targeting Inflation in Great Britain 
One of the most famous examples of targeting inflation is Great Britain, which 
accepted this concept in 1992, right after Canada and New Zealand, after aban-
doning the EU exchange rate mechanism. Due to an earlier inadequate monetary 
policy, which started from the agreement between inflation and unemployment, 
the results were periodical inflation upsurges, a 25% peak being recorded in 
1975.  
 
 
 
In England, the Government announces the targeted rate of inflation, and the 
Bank of England is the one which should strive to keep inflation within the 
planned band. The communication campaign is simultaneously led by both the 
Government and the Bank of England. If the inflation rate exceeds 1%, the Bank 
of England Governor writes an open letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer  
informing him/her about the reasons for failing to achieve the target, as well as 
the corrective measures the Bank intends to undertake.  
Unlike monetary targeting that basically focuses on a short- or a long-term 
timeframe, with a passive role of monetary policy, inflation targeting is aimed at 
the short-term, playing a much more active role. The fundamental nature of in-
flation targeting reflects in that if the estimated inflation rate is higher (lower) 
than the targeted, then it is necessary to increase (lower) the level of short-term 
interest rates.  
A high level of system transparency is of great importance for successful in-
flation targeting. All central banks in this regime, as a rule, publish numerous Nikola Fabris 
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reports that support the targeted inflation rate. These reduce any uncertainties 
with regard to the inflation rate, aiming at increasing central bank credibility by 
representing it as a „fair player”. Graph 2 show the types of reports and commu-
nication instruments used by central banks that have introduced this concept. 
However, there is no consensus about how far transparency should go. Some 
central banks, like the Bank of England, reveal publicly different points of view 
of the monetary board members, while others consider it a much better solution 
to announce only those things that have been agreed upon to a great extent. 
 
Graph 2.  Central bank reports used for targeting inflation 
 
Source: Kutner, K. (2004.), „Monetary Policy – Framework and Rules 
 
A common characteristic of all countries exercising inflation targeting is that 
they use the model for estimating the future inflation rate. Unlike in a monetary 
targeting regime wherein the estimate of inflation is based only on the monetary 
stocks, the inflation targeting regime uses all the information available to assess 
the rate of inflation. This could be a potential problem, because econometric 
model are still suffer from a lot of unresolved problems.
1 
This model has proved to be very successful in practice when it comes to 
lowering inflation. B. Friedman (2003), Svensson (2000), Bernanrke (1999), 
Jonsson (1999), and many others have come to the conclusion that countries ex-
ercising inflation targeting have achieved relatively low rates of inflation. How-
ever, most of them also concluded that the performance of these countries with 
regard to inflation did not differ from that of developed countries that have used 
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some other monetary regimes (Bernarke 1999, Jonsson 1999).
2 A recent IMF 
study (2005) showed that inflation targeting in developing countries has no 
negative effects on economic growth, whereas the rate of inflation is much lower 
than that in developing countries that exercise some other monetary regime. 
However, this conclusion would hardly be sustainable if observing only Euro-
pean countries in transition that have pegged their exchange rates to the euro. 
The ECB (2006, p.8) points out that the successful sustainability of this regime 
in economies in transition requires institutional central bank independence, a 
well-developed technical infrastructure, and the absence of too great a sensitivity 
to exchange rate developments. The implementation of this regime is hindered 
by underdeveloped capital markets, fiscal dominance, and insufficiently power-
ful monetary policy instruments. This regime implies a free exchange rate fluc-
tuation and may lead to negative economic performance since in periods of large 
capital inflows it brings about the appreciation of a national currency and the 
weakening of an economy`s competitiveness.  
Critics of this regime argue that even though it is based on rules, inflation 
targeting actually represent a pure discretion, and too great a discretion may lead 
to large inflation rate fluctuations. They also stress that regardless of insisting on 
transparency, this regime remains insufficiently transparent since its essence 
represents a model-estimated inflation rate serving as the basis for manipulating 
monetary policy variables. An estimated inflation rate is often conditional, asso-
ciated with movements of interest rates, exchange rates, and the like. The public 
often do not understand how the model has been created and how it functions, so 
it can be considered as being a non-transparent approach. Its weakness is also in 
that this regime mainly rests on a forecasted inflation rate, and forecasting tech-
niques are still insufficiently reliable. Also, the basis of this model is a free ex-
change rate fluctuation that could have negative effects on some economies in 
transition and developing countries that are less competitive, with poor credibil-
ity of economic policy creators, and insufficiently developed financial markets. 
The objection to this model is that the public could come to the conclusion 
that a central bank focuses only on price stability, simultaneously neglecting 
other economic objectives. This conclusion is correct because the central bank 
task is to maintain the inflation rate within the set target. Since every economy is 
exposed to various shocks and occasional mistakes by the creators of economic 
policy, sporadic divergences from this target are present. In such conditions, 
central banks take corrective measures to bring back the inflation rate to the 
planned framework, and such measures could often have discouraging effects on 
economic growth.  
                                                 
2 It should be taken into account that low inflation rates were achieved in all developed countries 
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well as the econometric models and data sources, the fear of inflation and accompanying costs also 
increased, as have the level of central bank independence and central bank credibility.  Nikola Fabris 
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2. New monetary framework in Serbia
3 
 
On the meeting held on August, 30
th 2006, National Bank of Serbia (NBS) 
Monetary Board agreed on new principles and rules for managing monetary pol-
icy. New monetary framework is applied from September and it’s rather similar 
to inflation targeting regime. As targeted inflation rate, zone between 7% and 
9% is determined for year of 2006, as well as from 4% to 8% for 2007. NBS will 
try to realize targeted inflation rate through corrections of interest rates applied 
on two-week repo operations. Other monetary policy instruments, like emission 
of long-term valuable papers or mandatory reserve, will have auxiliary role in 
realizing targeted inflation rate. Its goal is to contribute unobstructed transmis-
sion of the main referent interest rate. Also, foreign currency reserves within 
new framework, according to announcement, will be used rarely if there is de-
pletion of possibilities to influence inflation through referent interest rate, but no 
targeted numerical values will be determined for foreign currency exchange rate. 
It is foreseen to transfer onto floating foreign currency rate regime, after period 
of transition.
4 
Reasons for transferring to this new regime are consequence of prospective 
structural alternations, higher degree of opening to the EU and high degree of 
eurisation, which contribute to remarkably fast transmission of inflation col-
lapses. Estimate of National Bank of Serbia is that, in such conditions, foreign 
currency rate regime or targeting of monetary aggregates cannot provide stabile 
and low inflation rate. 
Is it wrong to orientate onto short-term approach is the first dilemma which 
occurs, with respect of time gaps in case of monetary policy. Namely, time gaps 
in terms of monetary policy are long-term and unpredictable. It means that al-
terations in monetary policy which are implemented today will affect price level 
after several quarters or years, i.e. monetary policy can neutralize collapses by 
the time, but they cannot be neutralized momentarily due to long time delays. It 
is obvious that application of short-term interest rate cannot influence current 
year inflation rate, but there is presumption for this year in accordance with 
Swenson’s proposition (1997) that creators of Serbian monetary policy targeted 
inflation rate which is estimated that will be realized.
5 Dilemma remains how 
much is possible to influence onto inflation rate in the next year. However, hav-
ing in mind choice of favorable moment for application of this regime (signifi-
cant capital inflow) and the fact that in less developed economies there are 
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shorter time delays during management of monetary policy, there is an impres-
sion that right moment is chosen. Also, it should be perceived that, longer time 
period for which targeted inflation rate is, lesser credibility level it bares.  
However, appropriate moment can be the source of potential future instabil-
ity. Namely, as a result of comprehensive capital flow it is expected at the end of 
this year that appreciation of dinar in ratio to EUR will amount 3% to 4%, and 
simultaneously inflation rate will amount around 8%. It means that in this year 
gap between inflation trend and foreign currency rate will amount 11% to 12%. 
Whether “strong” economy does not supporting this gap, it may be potential 
source for faster growth of foreign currency exchange rate from the growth of 
inflation in the period after cessation of significant capital inflow. It may initiate 
growth of inflation expectations and threat to the targeted inflation rate. 
In dilemma should inflation target be announced by NBS, Government or 
mutually agreed option, is that NBS should substantively announce inflation tar-
get, and later to access counseling with the Government. It means that NBS pre-
served both target and instrument independence. Announcement of targets in 
selected countries is shown in the following table. 
 
Table 1.  Inflation target announcement
6 
Institution announcing the target  Country 
Government  Brazil, Iceland, Israel, Norway, 
United Kingdom 
Central  bank  Chile, Columbia, Finland, Mexico, 
Poland, Spain, Sweden, Thailand  
Government and central bank  Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Korea, New Zealand, Phil-
ippines, South African Republic 
Source: “Establishing Initial Condition in Supporting Inflation Targeting”, 2003. 
 
In economies in transition and developing countries, the public debt to GDP 
ratio had been declining before the introduction of inflation targeting, and vice 
versa in developed countries. In transitional and developing countries which did 
not have satisfactory credibility the first thing to do was to send a strong signal 
to the public with regard to the systems sustainability. On the other hand, devel-
oped countries used to introduce this regime as a consequence of certain difficul-
ties (e.g. an increase in public debt) and a resulting growth in inflation. Serbia, 
similar to the most other economies in transitions, transferred to utilization of 
this regime within environment of improved macroeconomic performances – 
reduced share of public dept in GDP, budget surplus and single digit inflation 
rate. 
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As price index, which will be the subject of targeting, base inflation rate is 
chosen. From the calculation of base inflation rate excluded products are as fol-
lows: fresh vegetables, fruits, eggs, fish, bread, milk, cigarettes, electricity, coal, 
heating oil, drugs, oil derivates, commodities, TV subscription, social protection 
services, traffic and postal services. It factually means that excluded prices are 
only the prices controlled by the state, affected by seasonal factors or interna-
tional stock exchange trend results. Such selection of indexes is correct, because 
it consequently excludes the prices of products on which monetary policy cannot 
influence and which reduces a risk of unfeasible inflation target. Also, most of 
the countries on the beginning of implementation of this regime have selected 
basic inflation rate. 
However, potential weakness of this process is NBS announcement (2006, p. 
2): “Monetary policy will strive to implement other targets as well, on condition 
that it does not endanger realization of targeted inflation rate, i.e. if it does not 
endanger institutional mandate of preserving financial stability, which is neces-
sary to realize simultaneously with mandate of prices stability”. Recently, there 
is a tendency of considering financial stability as a Central Bank target, how-
ever, as Icard (2003, p. 225) emphasizes no Central Bank explicitly specify fi-
nancial stability as its basic target. Reasons are very precise, because Central 
Bank cannot cover all aspects of financial stability, nor the banks with the widest 
grade of supervisory rights are not controlling retirement funds, hedging of 
funds, and in only few cases control insurance companies. NBS, beside bank 
control, is authorized for control of insurance companies, yet cannot be respon-
sible for other segments of financial market. Although price stability and finan-
cial stability mostly «go» along, the fact that should not be overlooked is that 
they can be conflict targets. For example, for preserving price stability contrac-
tionary monetary policy may be necessary and, through growth of interest rates, 
it may lead to violation of financial stability. However, this is a consequence of 
partially said NBS Law, which says that the main NBS target is maintenance of 
price stability, and then says that, beside basic target, NBS should realize finan-
cial stability, with no indication of clear prioritization of targets in case that 
these two targets become conflict.
7 Beside wide interest for financial stability, it 
is unlikely that it will become explicit target of the central banks. The reasons 
are multiple, because financial stability do not conform basic conditions for be-
coming the target of the Central Bank: precisely defined, publicly comprehend-
ible and that is under the control of the Central Bank. 
In order to strengthen the role of referent interest rate two-week repo auc-
tions is announced on which price will be determined in advance, as well as two-
month repo auctions. Also, issuing of long-term financial records is foreseen. 
However, the remaining dilemma is whether reference interest rate is sufficiently 
«strong» to affect reduction of inflation expectance, in conditions of widely 
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spread out informal eurisation (reducing effectiveness of monetary policy), in-
sufficiently developed market of money and capital. Factually, inflation expecta-
tions in Serbia until recently were connected to level of foreign currency ex-
change rate, and if with continual appreciation of dinar in the last four, five 
months prices did not decrease, there’s still dilemma about variable which 
dominantly influence on inflation expectations. The most likely it is public esti-
mate that «strengthen» of dinar exchange rate is only temporary,
8 so inflation 
expectations are directed toward long-term expected dinar exchange rate. 
Critical success factor of inflation targeting represents high level of mone-
tary policy transparency and «offensive» public performance. Time when central 
banks used to be traditionally closed institutions and when they provided public-
ity with poor and selected information is long gone. Inflation targeting signifi-
cantly influenced onto increasing of transparency of Central Banks, which led to 
regular communication between publicity and Central Bank. «Offensive» media 
campaign is important to persuade publicity in realization feasibility of targeted 
inflation rate and accordingly to influence on reduction of inflation expectance. 
Also, insufficient level of transparency rise doubt whether Central Bank’s con-
ducts policy of public good. In some countries there are laws on freedom of in-
formation, which disable secrecy of Central Banks operations and hiding of 
documents. For recent NBS monetary policy it could not be said that it con-
formed the highest transparency standards, although it was not performed in se-
crecy. There is an impression that, until now, NBS did not provide sufficient 
information on particular decisions rationales, associated risks, future forecasts, 
as well as announcing information from Monetary Council and Monetary Board 
meetings. Thus, very positive announcement of NBS is that it will soon initiate 
new publication entitled „Inflation report“, as well as regular press conferences 
after Monetary Board meetings in which decisions will be made. Also, according 
to announcement of NBS, publicity will regularly be informed on inflation tar-
gets realization with reasons rationale representing base to such actions, as well 
as monetary policy measures conducted for the purpose of realizing targeted in-
flation rate in the future. This announcement represents positive step toward the 
increasing of credibility of monetary policy creator and reducing of inflation ex-
pectations. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 There are numerous reasons for expecting temporarily strengthens of dinar exchange rate. First, it 
is mainly based on large capital inflow through banking system, privatization and foreign invest-
ments. Expectation is that these factors will not be able to have long-term affects strengthens of 
dinar currency, given it is not supported by «strengthens» of economy. Likewise, in conditions of 
long-term high deficit in checking accounts in balance of payments, it is inevitably, sooner or later, 
leading to depreciation of dinar exchange rate. Nikola Fabris 
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Table 2.   Communication instruments in countries exercising inflation targeting 
Inflation/monetary policy reports  Other means of communication  Country Announce-
ment of 
monetary 
policy 
measure in 
the media 
Fre-
quency 
Inflation 
overview 
and 
monetary 
policy 
actions 
Inflation  
forecast 
Announce-
ment of 
inflation 
forecasting 
model  
Media 
and 
public 
presenta-
tions 
An-
nounce-
ment of 
reports 
from 
MPC 
meetings 
Economies in transition and developing countries 
Brazil Yes  Quarterly  Yes Two-year 
forecast 
Yes Yes  Yes 
Chile Yes  Quarterly  Yes Two-year 
forecast 
Not all  Yes  No 
Columbia Yes  Monthly  Yes  Two-year 
forecast 
Yes Yes  No 
Czech Rep.  Yes  Quarterly  Yes  Annual 
forecast 
No Yes  Yes 
Hungary Yes  Quarterly  Yes  Two-year 
forecast 
Not all  Yes  No 
Israel Yes  Monthly  Yes Two-year 
forecast 
Not all  Yes  No 
Mexico Yes  Quarterly  Yes  Forecast 
quality 
discussion 
No Yes  No 
Poland Yes  Quarterly  Yes  Two-year 
forecast 
No Yes  Yes 
Philippines Yes  Quarterly Yes  Two-year 
forecast 
No Yes  Yes 
Serbia* Yes  Quarterly  Yes  Five  quar-
ter fore-
cast 
No Yes  No 
Thailand Yes  Quarterly  Yes  Two-year 
forecast 
Yes Yes  No 
Developed countries 
Australia Yes  Quarterly      Ye Two-year 
forecast 
Yes Yes  No 
Canada Yes  Semi-
annually 
Yes Annual 
forecast 
Yes Yes  No 
Iceland Yes  Quarterly  Yes  Two-year 
forecast 
No Yes  No 
Korea Yes  Quarterly  Yes Annual 
forecast 
No Yes  No 
Now Zea-
land 
Yes Quarterly  Yes  Two-year 
forecast 
Yes Yes  No 
Norway Yes  Every 
four 
months 
Yes Two-year 
forecast 
Yes Yes  No 
Sweden Yes  Quarterly  Yes  Two-year 
forecast 
Yes Yes  Yes 
Great 
Britain 
Yes Quarterly  Yes  Two-year 
forecast 
Yes Yes  Yes 
Source: “Establishing Initial Condition in Supporting Inflation Targeting”, 2003.  * - 
Column for Serbia was filled out by author of paper 
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Precondition for application of inflation targeting represents high level of 
Central Bank independence. There is an impression that it is the highest risk fac-
tor for inflation targeting in Serbia. Although, observed through law regulation 
NBS has satisfactory level of independence, actual independence level can be 
estimated as unsatisfactory. The best way to see this is through number of gov-
ernors which used to officiate on this position from October 2000. Until Novem-
ber 2000, Treasurer position was held by Vlatković, afterwards superseded by 
Dinkić, then Udovički in July 2003, and the last one was Jelašić, appointed in 
February 2004. After establishment of new Parliament, most likely to be held in 
February 2007, releasing of Jelašić is expected followed by appointment of the 
new governor. Within period of more than six years, which represents common 
governor's mandate, Serbia faced alternation of five governors due to political 
reasons. It produces a risk which bares a question will new governor be really 
independent and to manage only basic NBS mandate, i.e. on preserving price 
stability. 
Likewise, application of inflation targeting regime implies responsibility in 
the event of target realization failure. This presumption is present in theory, but 
responsibility is not foreseen in all countries which use this regime. In Serbia, 
also, is not predicted responsibility in the case of failure of inflation target. 
Potential problem may represent a fact that Serbia is within the process of 
accession to the EU. Condition for membership in European Monetary Union is 
two year participation in Exchange rate mechanism II, within which fixed ex-
changed rate must be maintained in acceptable fluctuation zone. It is clear that in 
the regime of inflation targeting is not possible to conduct two target policies – 
targeted inflation rates and targeted foreign currency exchange rate. However, 
European Monetary Union is distant future and this regime is practiced by some 
new EU members, like Czech, Poland, Hungary etc. 
Given a fact that in theory sole announcement of inflation target is not con-
sidered as sufficient for conducting policy of inflation targeting, NBS decision to 
transfer to the inflation targeting regime when conditions are conformed is a 
good action, because this way potential failure risks will be minimized. NBS 
announced expectation to accept targeted inflation process in the close future, 
after expiration of transition period, which is not timely defined. Thus present 
regime may be evaluated as a lite inflation targeting.  
The term of inflation targeting lite is introduced by M. Stone (2003.) This 
concept is related to those countries which use price stability as a target, but 
which are not in position to maintain inflation target successfully. The character-
istics of this group of countries are that they do not have great monetary policy 
credibility, but have multiple objectives and undeveloped financial systems with 
frequent interventions in the exchange rate market
9. Additionally, there is no 
                                                 
9 The reasons for frequent interventions in the foreign exchange markets are due to the fact that 
these are small countries with „narrow“ foreign exchange markets which are often under the influ-
ence of exchange rate fluctuations.  Nikola Fabris 
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transparency either in monetary policy objectives or monetary policy. The peg-
ging of exchange rates is equally unsuitable for these countries because they 
would be vulnerable to external shocks, as is monetary aggregates targeting due 
to volatile money demand. At the same time, a „weak” fiscal position (a high 
level of public debt) and undeveloped capital markets prevent them from moving 
to the traditional concept of inflation targeting.   
Stone has identified 19 countries that belong to this category. These are de-
veloping countries, such as: Algeria, Croatia, the Dominican Republic, Guate-
mala, Honduras, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Mauritius, Peru, Philippines, 
Romania, and the like. The most realistic option for this group of countries is 
either a pegged exchange rate policy or moving to traditional inflation targeting.   
Poland is a typical example of a country that moved from the lite variant to-
wards traditional inflation targeting. During the 1990`s, Poland experienced 
hyperinflation, widespread dollarisation, many structural problems, a high cur-
rent account deficit, and the like. However, with the implementation of structural 
reforms, a high inflow of foreign direct investments, continuous disinflation, 
growth in the Bank of Poland independence, and the like, the prerequisites were 
created for the introduction of inflation targeting. Therefore, in 1998, the Bank 
of Poland announced long-term (a six-year) and short-term (annual) targeted 
rates of inflation.  
 
3. Conclusion 
 
Inflation targeting regime undoubtedly has increasing popularity and the number 
of countries which use this regime is continually increasing, and it is real to ex-
pect this trend to proceed in the future. Econometric studies have shown that in 
countries which accepted inflation targeting policy the inflation rate fell, as well 
as inflationary expectations, and the spread between the nominal and real inter-
est rates, and macroeconomic indicators stayed the same or improved.
10 Inflation 
targeting critics argue that the same has been achieved in the US although it had 
not introduced an inflation targeting policy.  
Announcement of transferring to this regime in Serbia imposes numerous di-
lemmas, and before all, whether it is a good choice of monetary policy regime 
and is this regime prematurely introduced in Serbian monetary policy. There are 
numerous problems which will complicate implementation of this regime in 
Serbia in the future, as follow:  
  Too short initially determined inflation targeting period,  
  Poor effect of monetary policy instruments in conditions of widely 
prevalent informal eurisation,  
                                                 
10 For more details see: Gramlich, E., (2005), „The Politics of Inflation Targeting“, Euromoney 
Inflation Conference, Paris 
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  Insufficiently developed currency and capital market, which additionally 
reduce efficiency of monetary policy instruments,  
  Dilemmas whether two-week referent interest rate is sufficiently strong 
instrument to influence onto inflation expectations,  
  Could appreciation of foreign exchange rate in conditions of 8% infla-
tion represent a source of future depreciation of foreign exchange rate, after 
capital inflow cessation, and respectively generator of inflation expectations,  
  Insufficient level of NBS independence and 
  Insufficient level of monetary policy transparency (there are indications 
that this problem could be solved in the close future) etc. 
Therefore, decision of National Bank of Serbia to formally not accept infla-
tion targeting regime is reasonable, yet to transfer to this regime after certain 
(timely indefinite) period of transition. It is regime known in literature as infla-
tion targeting lite. Apart from not being formally accepted in Serbia, inflation 
targeting encompasses numerous features of this regime. It can be concluded 
that sequence of actions is performed in accordance with recommendations pre-
sent in theory literature based on the best practice.  
Momentarily, this regime cannot be entirely evaluated, because its imple-
mentation is on the very beginning, but in the close future it will be clear 
whether the action of NBS was good or premature.  
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Inflaciono targetiranje sa posebnim osvrtom na primenu u Srbiji 
 
Rezime: Targetiranje inflacije predstavlja monetarni režim koji je prvi put primenio No-
vi Zeland 1989. godine. Od tada se ovaj režim proširio na preko četrdeset zemalja sveta, 
a poslednjih godina ovaj režim počinje i da preporučuje Međunarodni monetarni fond u 
okviru svojih aranžmana. Ovaj režim je po pravilu uvođen onda kada je prethodni režim 
dao loše rezultate. Njegovu suštinu predstavlja ciljna stopa inflacije, visok stepen tran-
sparentnosti u vodjenju monetarne politike, odsustvo sekundarnih ciljeva, ali i odgovor-
nost za ostvarenje ciljne stope inflacije. Samo objavljivanje inflacionog targeta se ne 
smatra procesom targetiranja inflacije i od objavljivanja inflacionog targeta do prihvata-
nja koncepcije targetiranja inflacije mogu proći godine. 
Na prvi pogled može se javiti dilema da li ovo uopšte može biti monetarni režim i 
kako intermedijarni cilj može biti nešto što je i krajnji cilj. Ipak u pitanju je monetarni 
režim, jer on podrazumeva strukturni pristup da bi se ostvario cilj. Osnovna razlika iz-
među ovog režima i režima u kojem postoji potpuna diskrecija monetarne politike ogleda 
se u proceduri izbora cilja monetarne politike, inicijativi za ostvarenje cilja, kao i viso-
kom stepenu transparentnosti monetarne politike.  
U praksi ovaj model se pokazao dosta uspešnim kada je u pitanju obaranje stope in-
flacije. Međutim, većina kritičara je došla do zaključka da se performanse po pitanju 
stope inflacije, nisu značajnije razlikovale od performansi razvijenih zemalja, koje su 
koristile neki drugi monetarni režim. 
Režim inflacionog targetiranja nesumnjivo ima rastuću popularnost i broj zemalja 
koji koristi ovaj režim je u stalnom porastu i realno je očekivati nastavak tog trenda i u 
budućnosti. Poslednja zemlja koja je prešla na ovaj režim je Srbija, ali u pitanju je blaža 
varijanta inflacionog targetiranja. Stoga je posebna pažnja u radu posvećena primeni 
ovog režima u Srbiji. Može se konstatovati da je redosled koraka prilikom uvođenja 
ovog režima urađen u skladu sa preporukama prisutnim u teorijskoj literaturi baziranoj 
na najboljoj praksi.  
Najava prelaska na ovaj režim u Srbiji otvara brojne dileme, a pre svega da li je u 
pitanju dobar izbor režima monetarne politike i da li je možda ovaj režim preuranjeno 
uveden u monetarnu politiku Srbije. Postoje brojni problemi koji će u budućnosti otežati 
primenu ovog režima u Srbiji poput:  
  Isuviše kratkog inicijalno određenog perioda targetiranja inflacije,  
  Malog uticaja instrumenata monetarne politike u uslovima široko rasprostranje-
ne neformalne eurizacije,  
  Nedovoljno razvijenog tržišta novca i kapitala, koje dodatno smanjuje efikas-
nost instrumenata monetarne politike, Inflation Targeting With Special Review on Appliction in Serbia 
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  Dileme da li je dvonedeljna referentna kamatna stopa dovoljno snažan instru-
ment da utiče na inflaciona očekivanja, 
  Apresijacija deviznog kursa u uslovima inflacije od oko 8%, može biti izvor 
buduće depresijacije deviznog kursa, nakon prestanka priliva kapitala, i time genera-
tor inflacionih očekivanja, 
  Nedovoljnog nivoa nezavisnosti Narodne banke Srbije, 
  Nedovoljnog nivoa transparentnosti monetarne politike (postoje najave da bi u 
bliskoj budućnosti ovaj problem bio otklonjen) i dr. 
U radu se zaključuje da se u ovom trenutku se ne može dati potpuna ocena ovog re-
žima, pošto je njegova primena tek na početku, ali već u bliskoj budućnosti će se poka-
zati da li je bio u pitanju dobar ili preuranjen potez NBS.  
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